"Internal Criticism" and "Anti-libertarian Libertarianism"

Those who have been paying attention to my commentary online for a while have probably noticed a tendency that may be percieved as rather peculiar: I actually spend a lot more time critisizing formulations and ideas within the libertarian movement, rather than engaging in engaging in the more usual libertarian criticism of non-libertarian movements and ideas. Somewhat undestandably, this may come off as being contrarian and conflict-seeking behavior. However, I'd like to explain why I think that this is precisely what is necessary, that there is actually fairly good reason for me to being doing such a thing.

In the grand scheme of things, I genuinely consider modern libertarianism to be a superior paradigm in comparison to the bulk of contemporary political discourse. I engage in "internal criticism" precisely because I value libertarianism, precisely because I want to see it improve and suceed in the long-run. One of the things that I find attractive about libertarianism in the first place is that it seems to deal with fundamental questions in a way that I think has largely gone by the way-side in mainstream political discourse. For the most part, political philosophy is dead and has been largely supplanted by a mere analysis of party politics, poll numbers of "wedge issues" and a repetition of the memes of ideologies that no longer are particularly relevant to modern times.

Once one has become a libertarian, it could be said that there is a sense in which one has transcended a good deal of modern politics. The failure of the contemporary political paradigm could not possibly be more obvious, and is something we simply take for granted, and it is for precisely this reason that I do not particularly focus on critiqueing it. From my perspective, the basic problems with the liberal/conservative and democrat/republican paradigm are simply old news, and therefore common libertarian criticism of it ends up coming off a bit like an echo chamber, or at least rather repetitive and somewhat unecessary. Of course, it may have a use insofar as it functions to bring people over to libertarianism, but it does not really do anything to strengthen or refine libertarianism internally.

This is why I view the libertarian movement as a bit stagnant, in that the external things to critisize have long since been bludgeoned to death and we can only pat eachother on the back for seeing what's wrong with everything else for so long. Potential progress does not end once one becomes a libertarian, and I dare say that "radicalization" does not even end when one becomes an anarchist. While libertarians may tend to have a certain "heads up" that is lacking in other political movements, it has its own matters to work out. It is not as if various libertarians do not have their own baggage that merits criticism. There comes a time to turn "the pruning knife" inward, to aknowledge your own movement's failures and degenerations, to potentially slay your own sacred cows and steer the ship away from the solidification of a new dogmatism.

I think that it must be aknowledged that libertarianism, to one extent or another, has reached a point in which it is confused about its own identity and it is splintered into many factions that do not necessarily want to move society in anywhere close to the same direction. Some of its main institutions have formed their own party lines and sometimes seem to be foolishly resistant to new ideas, while various libertarian sub-cultures have formed that are not exactly pleased with the current state of "the movement" (in the broadest sense of the term). Some examples of these subcultures are (1) anti-political libertarianism and agorism, which tends to reject reformism, electoral politics and the LP (2) the alliance of the libertarian left, which tends to reject libertarian-conservative fusionism and (3) post-left anarchism, which tends to reject some of the baggage that the "libertarian socialist" paradigm takes for granted.

It's important to note that while such groups are definitely "libertarian" in a radical sense, they are simultaneously "anti-libertarian" in a more "mainstream" sense of the term. Some of what has been popularized as "libertarian" is actually vehemently rejected by certain libertarians and the identity of such sub-groups is at least partially formed on the basis of a rejection of certain elements within libertarianism. Frank Zappa was on to something when he said that "progress is not possible without deviation from the norm". On one hand, libertarianism in a general sense could be said to be a deviation from the norm. But, on the other hand, progress internal to libertarianism is inherently a deviation from its own norms, which starts "on the margin".

What some may percieve as negative "antagonism" and petty "infighting" may in fact be an important step towards progress. For example, when a figure such as Kevin Carson critisizes what he calls "vulgar libertarianism", this isn't merely some sort of baseless contrarianism, it is necessary "internal criticism". Carson is resented by certain people at the Ludwig Von Mises Institute precisely because he is challenging their norms, their sacred cows, their assumptions, their "party line". Libertarians may resist "internal criticism" only at their own peril, towards the end of cocooning themselves in. A movement kills itself if it does not yield the ground necessary to grow, and maturation can only occur with a certain willingness to destroy as a pretext towards creation.

I sincerely think that libertarianism and anarchism represent the transcendance of politics as it has formally been generally understood, and in turn it is the basis for a new paradigm of politics. However, it must continue to transcend itself, or to put the matter another way, it must be aknowledged that it has not yet fully transcended the old paradigm. Foundational figures, while they may function as an important referance point and a source of inspiration, should not be turned into sacred idols. There may even come a time to smash idols with the hammer of reason. But the goal is not destruction for the sake of destruction, but for the sake of construction. And this is precisely why I critisize, not out of the will to destroy libertarianism, but out of the will to watch it grow and succeed.

Onward, libertarian soldiers!

Non-aggression Is Not An Axiom

The non-aggression principle is not an axiom. By the term "axiom" I more or less mean something that is self-evident and irreducible, a stand-alone principle that functions as an obvious starting point from which everything else springs. This is not to say that I don't advocate the non-aggression principle or do not think that it is important, but it is to say that I think that its treatment in this way, as an "axiom", is a serious mistake that has had the consequence of oversimplifying libertarianism and providing no basis out of which to stop it from fragmenting into a multitude of contradicting social philosophies.

The first issue that strikes me is that, based on a plain statement of the non-aggression principle by itself, it is unclear how "aggression" and "defense" are distinguished from eachother, let alone what sort of view on violent "punishment" is supposed to jibe with it, and hence it seems like that would have to be clearly defined ahead of time. In short, the non-aggression principle will fragment into anything ranging from pacifism to a gung-ho cowboy doctrine without a much more elaborate philosophical investigation of the question. The moment that one does engage in a more elaborate investigation of this, the non-aggression principle quite clearly ceases to be irreducible and self-evident.

Another issue that inevitably rears its ugly head is that the non-aggression principle will potentially have completely different implications with respect to the question of property depending on what theory of property one assumes to begin with. Afterall, what constitutes "theft" is vitally dependant on what one would consider to be the basis for "justly owning" something in the first place, and how violence "in defense of property" is concieved of is unclear from a statement of the non-aggression principle alone. Once again, just like the question of a theory of "defense" and "punishment", the moment that we delve into a theory of property, the non-aggression principle is no longer functioning as if it is irreducible and self-evident, since its meaning is dependant on other theories and principles.

But the reasons for the non-aggression principle not being axoimatic runs much deeper than this. For one thing, it seems quite simplistic to act as if the entirety of moral and social philosophy can be completely reduced to the question "when is physical violence justified or unjustified?". This is simply out of touch with the entire history of moral philosophy, and the treatment of non-aggression as the only relevant principle actually functionally designates everything else to an "amoral" realm. This completely skips over any attempt to make an evaluation of different values, customs, and moral systems on their own merits, and it's quite clear that the non-aggression principle alone is, while perhaps necessary, not really sufficient as a basis to evaluate such things.

Perhaps more importantly, it doesn't make any sense for someone to simply accept the non-aggression principle at face value, without any underlying grounds for doing so. One would think that people accept the non-aggression principle because they have some sort of basic respect for people, not that they have some sort of basic respect for people because of the non-aggression principle. The very idea of accepting a principle for its own sake might be called into question: does anyone really do this? It would seem to make a lot more sense to propose that the non-aggression principle is a conclusion drawn from more fundamental premises, rather than as an ungrounded starting point from which all other premises are drawn.

This is what I mean when I insist, despite many libertarians' claims to the contrary, that the non-aggression principle is not an axiom. It does not mean that it is false or irrelevant, but that, if we want to be frank about it: it is literally completely meaningless and tootheless without a grounding and without its terms being clearly established ahead of time, and consequentially just about everything that libertarians may tend to oppose, as well as just about any concievable social system, can theoretically be compatibalized with it in the absence of a coherant grounding. And it is in this sense that Ayn Rand, while her blanket dismissals of libertarians may be too harsh and somewhat of a strawman, had a valid point when she noted a certain incoherancy to the libertarian movement, in that it comes off very much like a mish-mash of contradicting social philosophies.

"Thin" Libertarianism is a "Vulgar" Libertarianism

To begin with, let me define my terms here. By "thin" libertarianism I refer to the treatment of the non-aggression principle as a groundless axoim, and as the only value that is relevant to libertarianism, beyond which point all other values are treated as either irrelevant or equal in a relativistic manner. That is, "thin" libertarianism is essentially the notion that so long as the non-aggression principle is respected, all social arrangements (whether they be based on racial separatism, fundamentalist religion, patriarchy, sexism, etc.) are equally valid starting points for a free society and that one is effectively bound to be neutral towards them. From this perspective, the non-aggression principle is basically the sole value. This attitude is actually fairly common in libertarian circles.

"Vulgar" libertarianism was a term put into practise by Kevin Carson, primarily refering to the use (or misuse) of free market economics and various libertarian concepts to defend or promote corporatism, classism and bossism. However, while the concept was initially put foreward in the context of economics, I think that it applies to culture and the "social" sphere as well, which is to say that free market economics and various libertarian concepts can be and have been used to defend or promote all of the things that "thin" libertarianism tends to sanction or be neutral towards. Hence, what I am proposing is that "vulgarity" be recognized beyond the economic realm, and more as a general matter. Left-libertarians generally "get it" with respect to economics, but don't always "get it" as much with respect to culture.

A confused reaction to the rejection of "thin" and "vulgar" libertarianism is to assume that it implies abandoning the non-aggression principle and free market economics, but this misses what the point is completely. "Thick" libertarians are not saying that the non-aggression principle is a problem, but that its treatment in a vacuum, detached from any sort of fundamental grounding and without any sort of broader social context, is a problem. And non-"vulgar" libertarians (in the strictly economic sense of "vulgarism") are not objecting to free market economics, but to using it out of context to defend things that either do not necessarily follow from it or which can be objected to for independant reasons. Part of the point is that questions of physical violence do not constitute the entirety of social philosophy and free market economics does not inherently imply the normative premises and institutions of currently existing and traditional economic arrangements.

The fact of the matter is that "thin" libertarianism functions as a defacto sanction for every questionable ideology and social arrangement under the sun, and the more explicit it is in this sanction the more "vulgar" that it is. On one hand, there are those who do not explicitly favor such things, but nonetheless express neutrality towards them. On the other hand, there are those who do explicitly favor such things, and only use the non-aggression principle and free market economics as a tool to legitimize their own prefered forms of authoritarianism. With the former group, part of the problem is an inability or unwillingness to recognize social problems outside of explicit physical violence, and hence a dismissal of all concerns about "oppression" in a more general sense and negative social conditions. With the latter group, the problem is even uglier, in that they are deliberately using libertarianism as a tool to sugar-coat their authoritarian ideology.

It is in this sense that appeals to non-aggression and free market economics can be rather superficial and hollow sometimes, in the sense that they are used in a way that is divorced from consequences, context and a broader understanding of society. In fact, sometimes these appeals are self-detonating, in that the consequences of the positive beliefs and social arrangements that some people promote under the banner of libertarianism ultimately do reduce to some kind of aggression in practise, or they may be dependant on a degree of state intervention in a way that makes appeals to "the free market" rather hypocritical. One way in which this is manifested is as a tendency of some people to treat anti-statism in a purely negativistic sense to be the only goal, while the content and consequences of certain positive beliefs end up devolving into a defacto state in implemenation, or when certain ideological premises end up being an apt pretext for people who believe in them being lead to endorse authoritarianism.

For example, consider a society that largely accepts a communitarian and traditionalist ideology in which obedience to tradition and majoritarianism is stressed as the most important value. Not only are the masses of people who believe in this ideology easy pickins to be exploited by people with power, that their belief is an easy means for others obtaining power over them, but those who are marginal within such a society are effectively mince meat. While such a society could theoretically be nominally free, it is not likely to be free and even if it is initially free it is not likely to remain free for long. The structure and outcome of a society cannot reasonably be divorced from the values of the people within it, and it is in this sense that "thin" libertarianism is unstable as an ideology, in that it does not take a stand on values beyond a vague commitment to non-aggression (which splinters into multiple interpretations as it is), and this is precisely why it could be said to inherently lead to "vulgarity".

Thoughts On "Post-Left" Anarchism and Left-libertarianism

What is "post-left" anarchism? From what I have gathered, "post-left" anarchism is particularly a reaction to the conceptualization of anarchism propogated by people such as Noam Chomsky and Murray Bookchin (after his change of positions around the time that he came out with "social anarchism or lifestyle anarchism?"). "Post-left" anarchism, as the very nature of the terminology indicates, seems to be a position that certain people move towards after being traditional "social anarchists", and hence to be precise it would seem to be the case that one can only be a "post-left" anarchist if one was previously a "social anarchist". So if someone's starting point or past was not "social anarchism", the term may not apply well to them.

To an extent, I think that the term "post-left anarchism" may be somewhat misleading, in that the ideas embraced by "post-left" anarchists are not necessarily a total rejection of literally everything that may be associated with "the left", and it certainly does not imply an embrace of "the right". To be more exact, I think that it would make more sense to say that it is "post-vulgar-left", and by "vulgar-left" I refer to certain tendencies in contemporary "social anarchist" circles such as (1) a reformist strategy that tends to embrace contemporary social democracy and pragmatically endorse state-socialism, at least as a "lesser evil" (2) a knee-jerk opposition to or fear of anything that smells of "individualism" and "markets" and (3) a view that largely confines the qualifications for one being an anarchist to communism, even taken to the point of opposing mutualists.

To the extent that "post-left" anarchism can be considered a rejection of such "vulgar" tendencies, I would consider my own views to potentially be compatible with it, and I would consider "left-liberarianism", at least in the sense that it is understood by various mutualists and agorists, to not necessarily be opposed to it either. There clearly are numerous understandings of "left-anarchism" and "left-libertarianism", ranging from anarcho-communism to "leftish" and "left-friendly" variants of individualist anarchism. The meaning of "post-left" anarchism would seem to be ambiguous in this sense, considering the begged question of precisely what understanding we have of "the left". If we define "the left" rigidly in terms of things like communism and Chomskyism, then "left-libertarians" of the more Roderick Long and Kevin Carson variety would have to be said to not really be "leftists".

Of course, such a narrow interpretation of "the left" is not really merited, as there are plenty of "left-libertarians" that are critical of the Chomsky/Zinn and later-period-Bookchin kind of interpretations of "leftism". It certainly doesn't seem to make much sense to classify individualist anarchists and mutualists as "right-wingers". On the other hand, mutualism and individualist anarchism in a more contemporary context certainly seems to have been updated in a way that distinguishes it from a more hardcore "libertarian socialist" and traditional "social anarchist" interpretation. This puts some contemporary "left-libertarians" in a somewhat ambiguous, perhaps even "centrist", sort of position. It seems to me that "post-left" anarchism is not necessarily incompatible with some of the more contemporary and individualistic interpreations of "left-libertarianism", and to the extent that some indeed do come from a more explicit "social anarchist" starting point or past, they may even qualify as "post-left" anarchists.

Those of us who do not particularly have a past history of involvement in "social anarchism" (particularly those who have a past associated more with anarcho-capitalism and the American libertarian "mainstream"), however, may be in a more ambiguous position that is not as easily categorizable as "post-left". The contemporary "left-libertarian" paradigm can be considered a fusionist tendency in which people come from both "social anarchist" and "market anarchist" backgrounds and have moved towards a consensus and alliance that could be considered "somewhere in between" in a sense. So there is an inverse phenomenon of "post-leftism" that may be generally classified as "post-ancap" or "post-right-libertarian". I myself generally fall into such a group of people who made a shift "leftward" away from a more rigid sense of "anarcho-capitalism". So it seems like the landscape is more complex than a "left-anarchism" vs "post-left anarchism" dichotomy can account for.

Overall, labeling oneself in terms of what one has transcended doesn't seem particularly illuminating, other than as an indication of what one has put behind them. Of course, one's ideological history is certainly relevant to where one's head is at in the present, but taken by itself it does not necessarily indicate what one's ideology currently is with too much clarity. "Post-leftism" has certain issues of ambiguity, much like the term "post-modern" does. In either case, what ultimately matters is not a question of ever-shifting labels, but the specific ideas in question. My thoughts here are only intended to perhaps demonstrate the complexity of the ideological landscape, and to specifically ponder the relation that "left-libertarianism" and "post-left anarchism" may potentially have with eachother. I'm wondering what self-identified "post-left" anarchists think about this.

Racism and Thick Libertarianism

Over at youtube, Xomniverse made an excellent video that demonstrates the problems with a "thin" approach to libertarianism as it pertains to the issue of racism.

Buy (Or Steal?) This Book

Thoughts On Revolution

Something that I've thought about, and which has only been reinforced by a reading of Proudhon's "General Idea of The Revolution In The 19th Century", is that revolution could be thought of as a process or a tendency rather than an event or endpoint. In this sense, a social revolution could be thought of as being a perpetual tendency, and the moment that a revolution ceases to function as a process it risks becoming a stagnation and eventually a reaction to another revolution. All too often in history, various revolutionaries have culminated their project in a particular event, after which they have settled or established themselves and ceased to continue pushing foreward. They have contented themselves to revolt against a particular idea or system, only to stop there and take up the position of a conservative. This is the haunting paradox of traditional revolutions: that the old revolutionaries become the new reactionaries.

A more subtle concept of social revolution is not one in which a singular event reaches a particular absolute and stops there, but that of a perpetual process in which there is always progress to be made, in which the transcendance is on-going and the affirmations that follow from the negations nonetheless lead us toward new negations and affirmations. In this sense, we can say that "the revolution never dies" with a straight face and without fear of being misunderstood. The revolutionary destroys to create and creates to destroy. The social revolution cannot be summed up strictly as a mere negation, as there is always an implied affirmation that follows the negation. On the other hand, each new affirmation provides something new to potentially negate. In a sense, an absolute ultimate end state is never actually reached, and thank goodness that statis is neither possible or desirable. Social revolution is the perpetual dynamism of approximations.

Children's Rights FTW

Radgeek made an excellent post about the issue of children's rights. I'm glad that more and more libertarians have been rushing in to make clear that they do not support the horrific notion that children are the defacto private property of their parents. This is one of my pet peeve issues, in that I think that children's rights is a relatively neglected issue for libertarians that is very important and I have gotten extremely alarmed whenever I have seen certain libertarians taking an authoritarian view on parenting.

To the extent that certain libertarians neglect supporting children's rights, this is a serious defect in the movement. If people can't even principally oppose child abuse, they are on shaky ground in any attempt to oppose adult abuse as well. Particular extreme social conservatives associated with libertarianism who do support child abuse should be called out for it, and libertarianism should be disassociated from such socially vulgar sentiments. Fortunately, it seems like only a minority of libertarians take such an authoritarian position. However, the fact that any libertarians at all take such a view on the matter in the first place should be alarming anyways, so I encourage such viewpoints being snuffed out of libertarianism.

Stefan Molyneux deserves some credit for making this a central issue (although I don't like the armchair psycho-analizing of people about their childhood, but let's put that aside for the moment). That credit shouldn't be one of particular originality, however, since such ideas come straight from Alice Miller. Traditional models of the family and traditional modes of parenting are far more authoritarian and negative in their consequences than most people (and psychologists, for that matter) seem to think. In either case, I'm glad that libertarians are making a key issue out of this and hope to see more work on it in the future.