Religion, Politics and Philosophy

I made a recording of a conversation with me, Paul (also known as "Zeko") and his roomate about religion, politics and philosophy: Religion, Politics and Philosophy. While it may not be formal enough for a podcast, I found it recording-worthy.

This is part one. I also recorded part two: Religion, Politics and Philosophy (Part Two).

One-dimensional Thinking

Some may wonder why I make such a big deal of the generalized hostility between "anarcho-capitalism" and "social anarchism". The reason it's a big deal is because it's a manifestation of one-dimensional thinking on "both sides". It's like the exact same thing as Democrat vs. Republican, only transfered to anarchism. In fact, in many ways the entire thing is a result of anarchists being affected by mainstream political rhetoric and taking their biases from the previous non-libertarian positions with them and still clinging to them. Consequentially, many of the exact same conflicts that occur in mainstream politics are mirrored internal to the libertarian and anarchist movements, because it is still effected by the binary and one-dimensional categorizations of politics.

We're being presented with a false dichotomy. The hardcore anarcho-capitalists give us a choice between being hardcore anarcho-capitalists and being irrational communists who favor violence and the destruction of property in mass. The hardcore anarcho-communists give us a choice between being hardcore anarcho-communists and being corporatists and neo-feudalists who favor a landlocked society. The hardcore end of both sides give us a false choice: either everything should be "private" or everything should be collectivized. There is no option for a middle ground or any kind of meaningful pluralism - it's either "ancap" or "ancom" in the most absolutist sense.

The problem is that neither of these options are sensible. A world in which literally everything is strictly "private", in which all land is "sticky", logically leads to feudalism and monarchy and is full of practical problems. A world in which literally everything is strictly "collective", in which the "personal" is neglible, logically leads to mob rule and communitarianism and is also full of practical problems. And when either of these are proposed as some sort of absolutist model for all of society, quite frankly they are both implicitly authoritarian. There simply is not unanimous consent over such matters or on economic models in general.

In short, the problem of "vulgarism" infects both anarcho-capitalism and elements of "social anarchism". The vulgar anarcho-capitalists either implicitly or explicitly fall back on oligarchal models for a society and end up defending state-capitalism, while the vulgar social anarchists either implicitly or explicitly fall back on communitarian models for a society and end up defending state-socialism. As the conflict increases, both sides end up being radicalized in opposition to eachother in a reactionary sense, and are pushed respectively towards authoritarianism. There is a tendency to conflate one's economic model with liberty as such, or to dress up one's particular authoritarian preferences in the rhetoric of liberty.

And the conceptual framework of the "vulgars" is one-dimensional. On the vulgar anarcho-capitalist side, anything remotely smacking of "the social" or "the collective" is knee-jerkedly assumed to be inherently coercive. On the vulgar "social anarchist" side, anything remotely smacking of "the market" or "property" is knee-jerkedly assumed to be inherently coercive. The reason for this one-dimensional thinking is, in part, a mere continuance of the effect of modern political rhetoric, only unfortunately it affects the anarchist and libertarian movements. Hence, some anarcho-capitalists still function as if they were Republicans, and some "social anarchists" still function as if they were social democrats.

There is a problem of the emotional attachment to certain words and ideas. A fetish is made out of certain narrowly understood things - such as "the market" and "the workers". Vulgar anarcho-capitalists tend to have an obvious emotional attachment to "capitalism" and have merely turned Marx's class-psychoanalysis upside down and drowned themselves in a naturalistic fallacy (hence, the armchair psychoanalysis of socialists as "envious" and having high time preferance, and the blanket praise of "captains of industry" as especially well-endowed and brilliant individuals). I can imagine the immediately negative imagery that comes into their heads at the sound of the term "worker's council". Eek! The proletariet are coming to get us! Prepare for the Stalinist gulags! They're going to smash our windows and squat our homes! Lay down G.I.! Lay down G.I.!

Not that the vulgar social anarchists cannot be just as knee-jerk and eye-roll-worthy. Vulgar social anarchists tend to have an obvious emotional attachment to "socialism", "communism" and "democracy". Of course, Marx's psychoanalysis tends to influence them, and hence there is the armchair psychoanalysis of individualists as heartless scrooges, hermits and assorted psychopaths who would sell your children on "the free market" in a heartbeat if they could make a profit off of it - as they chant slogans such as "work for a boss or starve" and make analogies to little old ladies being thrown out on the streets. You dare complain about your taxes? How dare you hate the community! Why do you hate the poor? After the revolution, you will be shot, you petite burgeousie!

This can be incredibly frustrating for people who do not absolutely fall on either side of the one-dimensional dichotomy. Hence, a left-libertarian market anarchist could be confused as a Marxist by a vulgar anarcho-capitalist, or they could be confused as an anarcho-capitalist by a vulgar social anarchist. Where do the radical agorists, mutualists and left-libertarians fit into this one-dimensional thinking? They simply don't - their worldview tends to be way too ecclectic and subtle for such one-dimensional categorizations to properly take them into account. In general, an entire tradition of left-wing-friendly individualist anarchism is lost in the shuffle.

"Anarcho-mercantalist" Misrepresents Me

"Anarcho-mercantalist" made a blogpost responding to my criticism of Cork's blogpost.

"Anarcho-mercantalist" begins by claiming:

Alex Strekal has responded to Cork's post on his rejection of the "anarchist" label. Below, I will neither defend Cork's nor Alex's positions, but to clarify the positions on each side.

So he is claiming to be clarifying my position for me. Unfortunately, this cannot be done, because he is not me. He goes on to misrepresent my position. He claims:

Alex in his past affiliation with minarchism, had defined "anarcho-capitalism" as a specific model where large bureaucratic corporations predominate. Alex still appears to retain the same meaning when he speaks of "anarcho-capitalism."

This is a misrepresentation of me. What affiliation with minarchism? I had come to negatively define anarcho-capitalism after having been one myself! Hell, I even critisized cookie-cutter anarcho-capitalism upon becoming an agorist - since I consider agorists to be left-rothbardians while cookie-cutter anarcho-capitalists are more prone to be right-rothbardians. I was a minarchist a number of years ago, not any time recently. The claim that I was a minarchist while making such claims about anarcho-capitalism is false - I held the exact same position I do now upon making those claims and considered myself a market anarchist. The allusion to me as a minarchist has nothing to do with this.

Furthermore, this isn't exactly how I have negatively defined anarcho-capitalism. After having been one myself and after having ditched anarcho-capitalism, I have concluded that many self-styled "anarcho-capitalists" do in fact advocate a corporatist model for an economy. But that isn't the sum of my position at all. My problem with anarcho-capitalism is in the assumption of a certain absolutist norm of property rights and by making a reductio ad absurdum out of what *some* anarcho-capitalists advocate - such as a city owned by an individual (a defacto monarchy).

Anarcho-mercantalist would like to fool people into thinking that all of this is purely a semantic issue when it isn't. What I am critisizing is not just the label "anarcho-capitalism", but the substance of what *some* people who attribute that label to themselves advocate. Namely, the assumption that "everything should be private", the tendency to support top-down "privatization" schemes and in the case of the Hoppeans the tendency to normatively advocate very strict exclusion and neo-feudal models for an economy. This is not merel about labels.

He goes on to make claims about what mutualists and left-libertarians think and implies that it is a semantic issue:

Both the mutualists and the "anarcho-capitalists" define "capitalism" as a free-market with neo-Lockean land ownership. For instance, Kevin Carson, looking at his analysis of Tucker's "land monopoly," defines "capitalism" as a system that has "sticky" land ownership. Shawn P. Wilbur on his blog defined "capitalism" as "sticky ownership of land" too

And there is nothing particularly semantic about this, as self-proclaimed "anarcho-capitalists" tend to unanimously endorse "sticky ownership of land". The critique of anarcho-capitalism that comes into play is not primarily semantic at all - it is generally revolved around the concern that "sticky ownership of land" as a normative absolute can justify authoritarianism, have bad socio-economic consequences and ultimately devolve into states. The concerns about anarcho-capitalism are not merely over the term itself, they are over the substance of what at least *some* anarcho-capitalists are promoting.

"Anarcho-mercantalist" goes on to try to insinuate that the term "capitalism" is semantically less confusing than "free market":

We have shown that the term "free market" can mean the second or third definition, when "capitalism" only means the second definition. Hence, many Austrian market anarchists like to use the less ambiguous term "capitalism" rather than "free market" to describe their thoughts.

The claim that "capitalism" is a less ambiguous term is simply false. It is a highly ambiguous term - it could mean any of the definitions that he gave prior. It can mean "the current corporatist economy", it can mean "private ownership of the means of production", it can mean "sticky land property" and it can mean "voluntary exchange". Market anarchists, if they use the term "capitalism", tend to primarily refer to "voluntary exchange", but that is hardly the be-all-end-all of what "capitalism" is understood to signify.

When market anarchists describe themselves as "capitalists", this is by no means unambigous from the perspective of most people - in fact, it tends to confuse the shit out of them. Furthermore, Kevin Carson is entirely correct to point out that there is a general trend for anarcho-capitalists to nominally define "capitalism" as "voluntary exchange" while simulaneously actually defending the effects of "the current corporatist economy". If anything, the exact opposite of "anarcho-mercantalist's" claim is the case: "free market" is much less ambiguous than "capitalism". But the entire point is that "anarcho-capitalists" themselves often selectively switch back and forth between the two and different meanings for them.

He goes on:

Likewise, many "anarcho-capitalists" consider the term "market anarchism" as umbrella term for mutualism and "anarcho-capitalism." The "anarcho-capitalists" therefore dislike the term "market anarchism" and choose to continue using "anarcho-capitalism."

Once again, anarcho-mercantalist is playing misleading word games with us here. I myself consider "market" anarchism as an umbrella term that can theoretically be used to refer to anything ranging from mutualism to anarcho-capitalism. That is my position, as taken on this blog and in my book! And I don't identify as an "anarcho-capitalist". So anarcho-mercantalist is being misleading by going on to claim that on this basis "anarcho-capitalists" dislike the term "market anachism". Some "anarcho-capitalists" likely dislike the term "market anarchism" precisely because it implies that they do not have a monopoly on free market ideas in anarchism. The resistance to "market anarchism" as an umbrella is a reinforcement of my own claim that "anarcho-capitalists" tend to be monocentric.

Anarcho-mercantalist goes on to misrepresent me on property:

Alex in his past said that he opposes "private property." As predicted, Alex has strawmanned Cork on "private property."

I both support and oppose private property depending on the context. I have never taken an absolutist anti-private-property position. Anarcho-mercantalist is therefore strawmanning me via oversimplification and single, non-qualified statements.

He claims:

I think Cork use "private property" to mean the "non-aggression principle"

To be more specific, Cork is using "private property" to mean "neo-lockean property" or "sticky property" and then conflating it with "the non-aggression principle". That is the problem. By "private property" anarcho-capitalists generally refer to their specific conception of property in a normative sense. This is what is meant by "accept private property".

"Anarcho-mercantalist" finishes by strawmanning me some more and playing word games:

Unlike Alex, I support "private property" in certain contexts of the term and oppose it on other contexts. Also, I support "corporations" in certain contexts of the term and oppose it in other contexts. Similarly, I support "economic egalitarianism" in the sense of the "equal pay for equal work" doctrine but oppose "economic egalitarianism" in the sense of violent intervention in the marketplace. I do not view words to only have one meaning.

Once again, I have never claimed to oppose private property in any communist or absolute sense. He is also playing semantics over the meaning of "corporations" here, implying that a mere internal contractual agreement among involved parties to be a "corporation". Actually, that's a "cooperative"! Anarcho-capitalists like to selectively redefine "corporation" to the definition of a voluntary cooperative, and yet they often use this to obfuscate the matter while defending "corporations" as they currently exist (Stephan Kinsella is guilty of this).

They also tend to predict that a genuine free market would have corporations (in the sense of a highly vertically integrated firm with uniform limited liability) as if it is the same thing as a cooperative. The problem is that limited liability as we know it is an entirely different animal then a mere contractual agreement in a free economy, and a huge corporate entity as we know it in the contemporary economy cannot come out of such purely internal agreements. When libertarians conflate these two different things under the same name of "corporation" and proceed to defend "the corporation" the charge of "vulgar libertarianism" is entirely merited.

One final note to anarcho-mercantalist: you tend to speak as if you know my personal history with libertarianism. You don't. I was a minarchist about FOUR years ago, and it makes no sense for you to try to bring my days as a minarchist into this. I started this blog around the time I was already well into anarchism and was beginning to veer away from anarcho-capitalism. You should stop making false proclaimations about my progression in terms of political ideas. It erodes your credibility and is a pain in the ass. Indeed, you have displayed a tendency in the past to do this with people in general, define their position for them and act like you have special insight into the progression of their thought. It's disingenous.

Fallacious Rejection of Anarchism

Over at his blog, "Cork" has posted what is meant to be a clarification of his abandonment of the term "anarchism" and "anarchism" as such. His initial rationalization is this:

I recently wrote about why I reject the "anarchist" label. Basically, the vast majority of anarchists are hard-core communists, and anarchism is commonly associated with opposition to the free market.

From personal experience, I know that his claim that "the vast majority" of anarchists are "hardcore communists" is simply false. There are plenty of anarchists who are not "hardcore communists" or communists of any sort. Anarcho-communism is only one branch of anarchism among many others. In terms of those who approach anarchism as a serious political philosophy, in fact the vast majority of anarchists that I have encountered have not been communists. The vast majority of communists that I have encountered, on the other hand, have hated anarchists. It is not as easy to tar anarchists with the red brush as Cork seems to think it is.

Part of the problem here seems to be overgeneralization on Cork's part, which is to say the assumption that people are necessarily communists if they veer very much to "the left" of individualist anarchism. But even anarcho-collectivists in the mold of Bakunin are not actually communists, and one must aknowledge the distinctions between anarcho-communism and other segments of social anarchism. At first glance, distinctions between, say, Bakunin and Kropotkin may seem negligible, but certain aspects of Bakunin's ideas could actually be used to veer an anarcho-communist away from anarcho-communism. In either case, I don't think it's exactly fair to lump social anarchists in with communism quite so easily.

Cork does sort of aknowledge individualist anarchism:

Individualist anarchism has always been the exception to the rule. While anarcho-capitalism is an offshoot of individualist anarchism, it has its roots more in classical liberalism and the Old Right than in the movement of Proudhon and Co.

Cork seems to be disconnecting individualist anarchism from anarcho-capitalism, and there is an extent to which he very well should. Individualist anarchism in the 19th century was part of or related to "libertarian socialism", which is to say that it was always "anti-capitalist" in a sense. However, if Cork really wants to maintain that "anarcho-capitalism" is severed from "anarchism" proper, then he should basically be conceding that "anarcho-capitalism" is actually just a form of minarchism or classical liberalism, which means that the "anarcho" prefix shouldn't be there at all. But he would be shooting himself in the foot if he did this, since it would only bolster the accusation that "anarcho-capitalists" are really just state-capitalists in libertarian clothing. In other words, by his own logic, he should also ditch the term "anarcho-capitalism".

Furthermore, "the old right" has practically nothing to do with anarchism of any sort. It's a specifically 20th century American phenomenon that narrowly has more to do with "isolationism", "constitutionalism" and "anti-newdealism" than any sort of explicit and general anti-authoritarianism. To be sure, "the old right" did have a comparatively anti-statist attitude when contrasted with the post-WWII American "right", but the history of the American conservative movement has almost nothing to do with radical libertarianism. In fact, the revival of radical libertarianism in America took place long after "the old right" fragmented and with the rise of "the new left". To the extent that it had anything to do with "the right", it was mostly a matter of people fleeing "the right", not re-embracing it.

Again, here it seems like Cork is being rhetorical and misrepresentative:

"Anarchist" these days is seen as one of 20 leftist sects handing out pamphlets at the Socialist Workers of Eurasia (or whatever) book fair, perhaps at a table next to the Maoists. No thanks.

This is basically just off-the-cuff mockery and misrepresentation. Clearly, this is a jab at anarchist book fairs, implying that they are merely a conglomeration of factions of state-socialism and the serious anarchists are some sort of tiny minority at an "anarchist meetup".

Cork also states:

People would be free to set up "voluntary socialist" institutions in an ancap world, so long as they are voluntary, non-coercive, and based on private property.

While this gives the impression that he is open to pluralism, notice that it is predicated on "an ancap world", which is to say the presumption that "ancap" is the normative absolute in the first place. So this actually isn't a meaningful pluralism at all, since it presumes that the "voluntary socialist" must accept the "ancaps" normative ethics (emphasis on "and based on private property") before pluralism is possible - at which point they would cease to be meaningfully distinguishable in the first place. Think about it: those who question "private property" would be free to organize as they see fit if they - accept "private property". This isn't actually a compromise then, it's rather one-sided.

Cork closes thus:

The thing is, all these institutions would still have to exist within the general framework of a market economy. Even socialist states have to trade with the outside world and thus deal with markets to some degree. The market can never be abolished entirely. Anarchists--in the common sense of the term-- refuse to understand this, which is why I'm not one.

Again, this all seems rather hasty to me. Because one over-generalizes anarchists as economically ignorant communists, one should ditch anarchism as a label, movement and philosophy? What other direction can one possibly go than back towards classical liberalism and minarchism? Cork wants to do away with "anarchism" proper while still clinging to an "anarcho" prefix, or while acting as if the "anarcho-X's" that he opposes can be subsumed under the system that he is sort of proclaiming to not be anarchism in the first place. This is confusing, to say the least. It all hinges on what his conception of "the general framework of a market economy" is and the implied requirement that the "anarcho's" concede to an "ancap" normative standard of property.

On one hand, I think that Cork actually sets up too much of a contrast or dichotomy between individualist strains of anarchism and more explicitly socialist strains of anarchism, clearly denigrating the socialist strains of anarchism. On the other hand, I think that Cork doesn't distinguish "ancap" from individualist anarchism enough, lending credibility to "ancap" that allows him to advocate it as an overall system that everything else can be subsumed by. He wants to attack the bulk of the anarchist movement and dissassociate himself and "ancap" in general from it while still simultaneously trying to lend some "anarcho"-credibility to "ancap".

But it seems like he cannot have it both ways. If "ancap" is entirely different than "anarchism" proper, then Cork should simply admit that what's favored is "capitalism" as such from his point of view. But if he wants to maintain that "ancap" has a legitimate place in "anarchism" in some way (and hence is not mere "capitalism" or classical liberalism), then he cannot be creating such a great gulf between it and "anarchism" proper. If "ancap" is really just "pure capitalism" and is strictly dichotomous with "anarchism" proper, then he should not simultaneously pretend that there is a genuine pluralism here. But if "ancap" is a legitimate "anarcho-something", then Cork has to abandon such a strict dichotomy and "ancap" must be understood as only one piece of a larger pie of "anarchism". Which is it?

The Maximization of Profit as Morality

The following is a working paper which has been tumbling around in my head for some time now. It is by no means perfect and it may even be highly flawed, at least in its present state. I am posting it here to get feedback. Where have I gone wrong? How can I extend the things which I've tried to explain? Does my hypothesis make a claim I don't yet realize? These are things I'd be very happy to have input on. Again, this is a draft.

-----------------------------------

The Maximization of Profit as Morality

There exist two schools of thought in the world of ethics and morality. One school of thought says ethics and morality are only subjective preferences, and the other school deems ethics and morality to be objective. The former is the ethical nihilist point of view, and the latter is what can be called the ethical objectivist position. Before rushing to explain my own point of view on this matter, some clarification of the two viewpoints just mentioned is in order.

The ethical nihilists deny the existence of any kind of moral code that should be obeyed. The reason for such denial goes back to a sticky problem that David Hume discovered when discussing how people ought to act: the is-ought problem. When a human looks around at the world in which he finds himself, he sees what “is.” For example, he picks up a rock on a mountain hillside and is able to discern through his senses that the rock exists in reality; the rock simply “is.” This is the “is” side of the is-ought problem.

On the other hand, the human sees the world around him and the other humans that exist in it, and a question quickly presents itself: how should this human act toward the world around him and the other humans he finds himself in contact with? This is the “ought” side of the is-ought problem.

The reason for the problem is the huge gulf that exists between what is and what ought. That is, the human looks around and can see what exists in reality, but he cannot derive any objective standard of how he ought to behave from the knowledge of what is in reality. This quandary has led to the ethical nihilist position: each person must subjectively determine for himself how he ought to act, since there is no objective standard that must govern his actions. How one ought to behave is a personal decision, or so the argument goes.

I fully accept the is-ought distinction, and I am not claiming, like so many ethical objectivists have in the past, to have found a way around it. Instead, I only attempt to hint that I may have bridged the gap in a narrow way, but it's up to you to decide on the merit of it.

Human beings always seek to profit. Always. There are no exceptions. Every action you take is done in the desire to profit, properly understood of course. How can this be? Well, let us imagine a hypothetical person. We will call him, say, David. David gets up early one morning to head to work and goes to a local store to purchase a small cup of coffee. At the register, David hands the cashier $2 in exchange for the coffee. The cashier takes the $2 possessed by David and gives David the coffee possessed by the store. Now, the store is in the possession of the $2, and David is in possession of the coffee. This exchange has been profitable for both David and the store. The reason is David now possesses something (the coffee) he valued more than that which he gave up in the exchange (the $2). That is, David profited to the extent that he valued the coffee he gained over and above the $2 he gave up. We can know for certain that David did profit, given the assumption the exchange was voluntary, because if David did not value his state of affairs post-exchange more than his state of affairs pre-exchange, he would have never made the exchange in the first place.

The hypothetical presented above can be extended to cover every conceivable human action, which means that every human action is a profitable action from the point of view of the actor. For instance, David even profits when he picks up a book on the floor. This can be seen by applying the same analysis as explained above. David made a personal or autarkic exchange when acting to pick up the book. That is, David clearly valued the state of affairs post-exchange (book off the floor) over and above the state of affairs pre-exchange (book on the floor). Applying this analysis even further, we can see that David profits from merely scratching his nose, washing his hands, eating, running, wiggling his fingers, etc. It is, in fact, impossible to conceive of an action that is not profitable at the time the action is taken.

It is important to realize that David may regret any number of his many exchanges; he may regret buying the coffee, picking the book up off the floor, wiggling his fingers, etc., but that regret only exists in the ex post sense. We are talking about profitable actions in the ex ante sense; that is, at the time the action is taken.

Seeing that every action is profitable, it seems there is something innate in humans that causes us to seek profit in our actions. It is as if we are wired to act profitably. What’s more, an unprofitable action cannot even be comprehended (again, in the ex ante sense). Is this a biological fact which is rooted in the evolutionary history of life? Perhaps, but I do not seek to make any claims about biology. It is enough to say that humans seem to be hardwired to profit in everything that we do.

What can I extrapolate from this and claim about ethics or morality? I claim that it is ethical and moral to profit. That, in fact, there is no other way for a human being to act. At first glance it may seem as if I am claiming humans are always moral, since all acts are, by their very nature, profitable. However, with a deeper examination, I am not claiming that at all, as there exists a glaring notion that can make actions relatively less profitable: non-consent.

Underpinning the profitability of any action is the assumption that the action is based on the consent of the actor. Going back to the David hypothetical, if a gunman had threatened David with violence if David didn’t purchase the gunman a coffee, it should be evident that the nature of the exchange has changed dramatically. It is as if the gunman has hijacked the subjective values of David and replaced them with the gunman’s own values. It should also be clear that David is faced with an alternative. If David values his safety and security, he will likely comply with the gunman’s demand. However, since the violent demand of the gunman is not consented to by David, David would prefer not to be presented with this exchange, and this will be evident in a moment.

Can it be said that you profit from an exchange that you are violently forced to make? Yes, but less so than would have occurred without the violence. There is an opportunity cost connected to non-consented actions. Removing consent causes relative profit to fall. Since we know every action is a profitable action, it can be said that the most profitable actions are those that are based on consent, since no one prefers actions not based on consent, for even the masochist consents to his pleasure from pain.

Imagine the two possibilities to profit from actions as arranged on a value scale:
1) Profit from consented action
2) Profit from non-consented action

Whenever non-consented action is forced on an actor, it must necessarily -- since it takes place through space and time -- take the place of a consented action. This causes a fall in relative profit for the actor involved. If left to his own consensual devices, humans will always maximize profit by taking those actions that are subjectively preferred over others, and this is an unavoidable natural condition of how humans act.

To say it another way, humans will be relatively less profitable to the extent that non-consented action replaces consented action.

It is almost as if our human instincts recognize this relative fall in profit or opportunity cost. Is it not the case that when you are personally the victim of a violent, non-consented action, you feel a sense of revulsion deep within you? Perhaps our emotions and basic human instincts are more in tune with the realization of this opportunity cost than we recognize.

What if it is proposed that the gunman may get more profit from imposing his violent act on David than David loses in being imposed upon? The idea that the gunman profits more than the relative loss to David is not knowable since one cannot compare subjective profit among actors, but if one acts always by maximizing profit without vitiating the consent of others, one can know that everyone is achieving the maximization of profit, which is innate.

To answer a potential counter argument, the gunman forgoing coercing David does not cause the gunman to have a dip in relative profit if the gunman decides voluntarily to abandon his violent plans. This is so because we know that all consented actions coincide with the maximization of profit. So, we can say that the gunman abandoning his use of force against David would be moral, since the gunman’s own voluntary act to forgo his violent plan maximizes his profit, and it allows David to maximize profit from his own consensual acts. Thus, if we have a moral proposition that says “maximize profit in all cases” we would, in effect, be telling the gunman to abandon his violent plans and that this abandonment would result in the maximization of profit. The gunman may be frustrated as he abandons his violent plans, but if this moral code of “maximize profit at all times” is obeyed consistently, the gunman would have to abandon his violent plans: David would thereby maximize his profit and the potential gunman would maximize his as well.

Why should the gunman value the maximization of profit in all cases, even the cases of his fellow human beings? Well, it can be objectively proven that in every act the gunman takes, he is seeking to maximize his profit. The gunman cannot argue that he does not prefer this, since he cannot escape his human condition. If the gunman examines his own human state, he is drawn to the conclusion that he himself values consented action more than non-consented action. By imposing non-consented action on David and causing a fall in David’s relative profit, the gunman is being inconsistent with his own nature as a human being.

I claim, then, that morality exists in humans maximizing profit consistently. David could, in fact, say to the gunman as he is being coerced that the gunman is not acting in conformity with his own subjective preference for profit maximization through consented action, and that the gunman is rebelling against human nature by forcing other human beings into non-consented action. The gunman knows he prefers consented action and he can also know that David prefers consented action. What is the problem here? If the gunman knows he values maximizing profit via consented action and that David values the same thing, why does he choose to coerce David? Why does he choose to cause David’s relative profit to fall and to act out of conformity with human nature? The gunman is forcing David into non-consented profit maximization, which the gunman does not himself prefer. The gunman can act outside of the maxim “maximize profit in all cases,” but he does so by abandoning the natural state of his own human condition.

What happens if the gunman decides to obey the moral code of profit maximization and to apply it across the board to others? Well, it results in a net rise in profit for all human actors, and it does not diminish the profit of the gunman. If the gunman consents to follow this human moral code, he is still maximizing his profit, since the choice to follow this morality was based on consent.

This morality is. It is how every single person voluntarily chooses to behave in every act: maximization of profit based on consent. There is no way to avoid it. What can happen, however, is humans can choose to rebel against this morality by forcing others into a state of affairs that they themselves do not objectively prefer. It is the job of this essay to make this objective preference of every human known and to request that you come into conformity with it by applying the morality that you objectively follow and prefer to everyone else in society.

Does this bridge the is-ought gap? In a way, it does. It demonstrates that how one ought to act is in fact the way one must act and the way one does act by nature of being human. The ought and is converge into one, at least in this sense. However, it only goes so far. This only meshes is-ought in the case of how other people ought to treat you, not how you ought to treat others. That is, it says that you act in order to maximize profit. Always. It says, in essence, you do not prefer to have someone aggress against you and force you to do non-consented acts. In a sense, it evidences a “don’t tread on me” preference that is universal among all human beings. The problem arises when one considers whether he should tread on someone else. Obviously, as has been stated repeatedly in different ways, all people prefer not to be treaded upon, but is it not the case that some might prefer to tread on others, even though they themselves do not prefer to have someone else tread on them?

What I would claim in this regard is every human being ought to defend the universal human preference of “don’t tread on me.” It might be the case that someone would want to coerce you, but your natural preference is to dissent from this coercion and to act in conformity with the universal human preference to maximize profit.

This moral philosophy merges the theory of natural rights with utilitarianism. It is a natural condition of man to maximize profit, and utilitarianism seeks the highest possible utility from actions, which we have simply labeled as profit in this discussion. It should also be noticed that maximizing profit in the universal sense could be called the ideal morality. That is, everyone profiting from consensual actions. Thus, maximizing utility and natural rights theory merge into one under this analysis.

Thus, we arrive at a moral philosophy, when obeyed consistently, which brings each human into conformity with what is naturally unavoidable and an innate human condition: maximization of profit.

Liberty or Equality? (First Draft)

I've decided to release a pdf of the rough first draft of the chapter "Liberty or Equality?" from "Reconstructing Libertarianism". I definitely need to work on this chapter some more, since I didn't elaborate anywhere near as much as I should on equality in terms of rights - I did little more than allude to Roderick Long's notion of "equality of authority" in this regard. I mostly covered the question of equality in a more consequentialist and pragmatic context instead. I used Murray Rothbard both as a point of reference for support and as the basis for some criticism of anti-egalitarian sentiments (I believe Rothbard is partially correct and partially off the mark in his essay "Egalitarianism As A Revolt Against Nature").

My defense of egalitarianism is mostly in terms of what Charles Johnson calls "thickness from grounds" and "thickness from consequences", which is to say that I think that a certain tempered egalitarianism is the "proper grounds" for libertarianism and that elements of heirarchy can be critisized on consequentialist grounds related to liberty. My criticism of certain notions of equality is generally directed towards Marxist cliches and the general will to produce equality through political means. While I do critisize "crackpot realism" and overt anti-egalitarianism, I don't exactly let the utopians off the hook here. Plenty of destruction can potentially be caused in the name of a shallow ideal of equality, and the rhetoric of equality is a powerful political tool.

To be clear, I explicitly reject the assumption that there is an absolute dichotomy between liberty and equality, as if they necessarily have to be traded off against each other. Hence, I try to establish some senses in which the two are intertwined and mutually reinforcing. On the other hand, I critisize the ideal of absolute socio-economic equality (in the generally communist sense) and the tendency to favor equality for its own sake to the point of opposing liberty. At the same time, I critisize what I see as explicitly anti-egalitarian tendencies that undermine libertarianism or may blind libertarians to violations of liberty or the extent to which socio-economic heirarchy may be intensified by political power (or the extent to which political power may be predicated on it).

Down With Renting

Over at the Mises Institute blog, Jeffery Tucker made the post "Up With Renting", in which he critisizes various political home ownership proposals and pushes the idea of favoring renting over buying in general.

While such political proposals should definitely be critisized, I think Tucker may be missing something here. The political class is not necessarily concerned with promoting home ownership. Home ownership functions more as the excuse through which to justify the extension of credit and the perpetuation of borrowing. I fail to see how it follows from the fact that the state has so-called "pro home ownership" schemes that we should be promoting renting homes over owning them.

To be sure, renting may make sense in a certain context when time preference is taken into account or if one simply lacks the means necessary to obtain ownership over a home. But in the grand scheme of things, owning a home establishes a certain kind of security that renting one lacks. Renting can sometimes put one on the verge of homelessness, since one is in a certain state of dependency on the owner. And owning obviously grants one a lot more leeway in deciding how the property is used. There is a sense in which it seems fairly intuitively obvious that ownership is generally preferable to renting.

Having a roof over your head, an abode that is your own, is a pretty fundamental benefit to have in a modern society. Of course this technically can be achieved, in effect, by renting in the short-term, but owning provides the certainty that you will continue having a roof over your head and that such a place is actually yours in the full sense. While in certain scenarios it may seem practical to rent, actually owning a home ultimately is more practical if one wants to have a stable environment in which to make one's abode over the course of one's life.

It may very well be said that a society in which the majority of people are merely renters while a small minority owns all of the homes (and all of the land for that matter) seems like a horrible scenario - it would essentially be feudalism. Feudalism is essentially what happens when land ownership is a highly restricted luxury. This is a bad thing because it puts most people in a state of dependancy, with negligible control over their own lives, with the risk of being at the whim of a small class of owners. The better part of the industrial revolution tended to erode such feudal arrangements and consequentially it opened up the possibility of more people obtaining their own homes.

The fact of the matter is that home ownership, generally, is way too friggin' expensive. Why the hell should it take a lifetime (or more) of hefty payments to obtain one's own home? That's simply ridiculous. By stating this, I am not making any claim of an "objective price", nor am I making a moral claim - I can see that knee-jerk objection from Austrians coming from miles away. I'm merely stating practical common sense - it's a pain in the ass for most people to pay off the expense of a home. It seems impractical and ridiculous from the standpoint of someone who doesn't have the means to buy homes willy nilly.

I fail to see anything wrong with the general promotion of the idea that people should generally own their own homes. In some ways, home ownership has some barriers to entry. People tend to rent because they simply cannot afford a home, and at such a point renting does seem like a convenient way out of the problem. But sometimes the rates tend to go up to the point at which one may as well have invested in owning a home, and renters end up getting screwed over.

While renting may be seen as a way to avoid the risks of obtaining ownership, renters may face the risk of getting tossed out onto the street in certain circumstances, due to economic fluctuations that are often caused by state intervention. On top of that, there are many ways in which state intervention could be said to artificially raise the cost of home ownership. Political "pro home ownership" schemes are often, at best, reactions to prior interventions that have tended to restrict the supply of affordable housing.

Ironically, there is an extent to which such political "home ownership" schemes set up the conditions for a point in the future in which the lending that it is based on becomes unsustainable, and hence eventually a bunch of foreclosures occur. So, in the end, it is the promotion of lending and borrowing that is going on here, not home ownership as such. It's merely a matter of perpetuating the financial system, while the housing market fluctuates like crazy over the years.

At the end of the day the result of these policies is not necessarily a net increase in homeownership, just a lot of unnecessary and wild fluctuation in the market and the continuation of a certain financial system. In the short term, home ownership might be increased for some people, but in the long term such ownership is based on a bed of sand when things fully pan out. And in the process, certain oppurtunistic people (often aligned with the political class) end up profiting from it while everyone else is screwed over. These are ultimately just ponzi schemes, not meaningful promotions of home ownership.

UPB, Eliminative Methodology and Consistency

I have a few more thoughts to add with what my objection is to Stefan Molyneux's UPB in the sense that it is a strictly eliminative methodology. By using the basic binary between truth and falsehood, Molyneux essentially says that by eliminating the proposition that "X is moral", the opposite of X (which may be called Y) is moral is inherently proven to be moral though such an eliminative process. For example, he would say that the elimination of the statement "murder is moral" proves that "murder is immoral", or the elimination of the statement "property rights are invalid" proves that "property rights are valid".

My first problem with this is that it does not really answer the question "why is X moral?" and "why should I adhere to this moral proposition?", and hence there is no positive case for X. The elimination of an alternative may help the case for one's premises, but it does not necessarily constitute a case in and of itself. To be sure, you may have given somewhat of a reason for why something is not moral, but it does not necessarily follow that the alternative is moral. It could be the case that X is neither moral or immoral, depending on what X is. In principle, a purely eliminative methodology could end up ruling out both parts of a given binary or dichotomy. And if a methodology is 100% eliminative, then it eventually eliminates itself. There has to be a constructive and positive element.

Another problem is this question: consistent relative to what? Molyneux wants to eliminate propositions on the grounds of their inconsistency, but inconsistency relative to what? The statement that "theft is moral" is obviously inconsistent relative to the assumption that "theft is immoral", but that assumption would be precisely what's in contention. The statement that "theft is sometimes moral and sometimes immoral" would be inconsistant relative to an assumed absolute binary between the two propositions. Or that kind of inconsistency may be veiled and someone claims "theft is immoral" but in substance they actually advocate forms of theft either without realizing it or in spite of their moral claims.

But that would then be either inconsistency between philosophy and action or internal inconsistency. While someone's position on politics, for example, may be internally inconsistent in terms of how they apply their principles, the revelation of this fact by itself doesn't prove or disprove the content of those principles, it proves that someone is not consistently applying the principles. There is a sense in which strictly using the standard of consistency in application of principles without regard for anything else, no knowledge can genuinely be postively built about the actual content of the principles. A principle can be consistently applied and actually be wrong, and a principle can be inconsistently applied that is actually right.

When plugging a given binary into UPB, both ends of the binary are inherently in polar contradiction to eachother, and yet the choice of which end of the binary to rule out as inconsistent with the other one seems to be completely arbitrary. For example, in the binary between "theft is moral" and "theft is immoral", I could concievably choose to rule out "theft is immoral" as being inconsistent with "theft is moral". The "leap of faith" that occurs in this allegedly purely eliminative process in which we choose which side of the binary to treat as primary will determine what the result is. It seems fairly obvious that internal consistency of principles cannot be the sole or ultimately determinative standard for the validity of principles as such.

Pacifism (the moral prosposition that violence is always immoral) is technically the most consistent position on violence relative to the general idea of non-violence or anti-violence. If we were to create a binary with pacifism as the primary principle, the other end of the binary would be the position that violence is always moral. Both of these principles are 100% consistant relative to either violence or non-violence. Most positions on violence, including libertarian ones, technically are "inconsistent" relative to these absolute standards. Is libertarianism therefore invalid? Of course not! But this illustrates that everything cannot necessarily be summed up purely in terms of internal consistency. It seems obvious that we must step outside of UPB to analize principles in more detail.

UPB can point out either when someone is inconsistantly applying principles or when their behavior contradicts their principles. This definitely has a certain valid use, but the problem is that by itself it is not sufficient to establish the truth value of propositions as such. Even if we assume the premise that something must be internally consistent to be true, a philosophy could be internally consistent while being inconsistent with reality. Internal consistency might be a necessary condition for truth value, but it is not entirely sufficient. There are plenty of propositions that are internally consistent but false. I'm more interested in how concepts relate to eachother. It isn't only a matter of internal consistency of concepts or consistent application of concepts, it's a matter of the derivation, interrelation and positive specification of concepts.

If someone asks you "why should I adhere to this moral proposition?" and your answer is "because it is consistent", that probably will not satisfy what they are really looking for and what they mean by the question. What would be more likely to satisfy their question would be an explaination of how the moral proposition relates to other values and the extent to which the principle may be consistent with their interest. They are not likely to just accept the moral proposition for its own sake because it is consistent, they need a positive case, they need to understand how the proposition relates to other concepts, what the consequences of the proposition are and how it applies to the circumstances of their everyday life. An eliminative methodology alone cannot do this.

There is a sense in which UPB inherently bumps into the is-ought dichotomy that Stef doesn't want to aknowledge. In order to defend UPB, he refers to the fact that there are no differences between people in terms of fundamental human traits, and I don't disagree with that point. But the problem is that this fact is not really relevant in that when someone proposes "slavery is moral", they aren't necessarily proposing that humans do not share fundamental traits. To talk about the fact that humans share basic properties is beside the point when the question is not a matter of describing properties but making prescriptive statements. Stef keeps shifting the question towards a description of traits, and yet that's not what prescriptive ethics does. It is fallacious to try to refute prescriptive claims by responding to them as if they are descriptive claims.

Moral claims inherently are not descriptions of "what is", as the very nature of a moral claim is to posit what should be. Strictly speaking, if "consistency to reality" is our standard for validating moral propositions, then no moral proposition can be validated because moral propositions are not meant to describe reality, they're meant to proscribe it. "What is" inherently diverges from a moral proposition so long as it remains a strictly moral proposition. If we wish to use "what is" as the sole justification for ethics, then the status quo is always ethical. If we wish to use "what is" as the unjustification of ethics, then any ethical proposition will have to be ruled out to the extent that the proposition is not already realized in the world. This doesn't make any sense.

In short, viewed eliminatively, approaching ethics in such a way should lead to moral nihilism, and viewed positively, approaching ethics in such a way would fly in the face of the purpose of ethics by justifying whatever occurs. In pointing this out, I am only rigorously adhering to the very is-ought dichotomy that Molyneux claims to adhere to himself. This is consequentially rather confusing, since Molyneux seems to insist on using "the is" as our criteria for ethics. But if ethics is only being established strictly in terms of "what is", then Molyneux's own method would seem to fall prey to the is-ought dichotomy, and yet he insists that UPB can yield and has yielded positive results; affirmations of ethics. I don't see how this can be the case if it is directly founded solely on description in this sense. How can he be somehow directly deriving an ought from an is (or from the elimination of an is) while claiming not to be?

Retrospective Thoughts On The Convo With Molyneux

[The podcast of the convo can be found here]

This post is meant to express my after-debate thoughts and a clarification of my position.

I think it was more of a conversation than a debate. We talked about libertarianism and philosophy, with the first half or so consisting more in epistemological and ontological concerns - and emphasis on methodology. Molyneux tends to go on tangents (or to "speechify") sometimes, which kind of makes it hard to make or sustain a point when his tangent has taken it in a completely different direction. He also tends to make analogies that don't hold or are not relevant to your point (for example, Molyneux made an analogy to the absurd scenario of sending someone a letter in the mail saying "letters never get delivered", when I was trying to question "self-ownership" - the analogy simply didn't fit or was not relevant to what I was talking about). It's easy to take an oppurtunity to opine on what is obviously an absurdity, but it may not actually be analagous to what's in question.

What The Hell Does "Ownership" Mean?

I didn't fully express what my issues with UPB are and we didn't really dig into the question of rights theory. My objection to the concept of self-ownership has to do with how it tends to be used in rights theory - I'm not denying that people have physiological control over their bodies, I'm denying that the affirmation of this fact proves rights concepts (this is what Hoppe's argumentation ethics claims to do). I'm also claiming that "ownership" is really a metaphor here - what Stef calls "self-ownership" (physiological control over one's body) is not the same thing as "ownership" as I understand it because "ownership" signifies something to be homesteaded, bought and sold (and surely libertarians do not intend to concieve of one's "self" as such to literally be "property" in this sense). Such "ownership" of the self is not the same as "ownership" over external objects. These are different senses of the word "ownership" by the very least.

I'm of the view that the "property" (in the descriptive sense of the word) of personhood is distinct from the "property" of ownership. This is part of why I think that the statement "I don't own myself" is perfectly valid - personhood is internal to the subject, while "ownership" is relational between subject and object. I can own things, but those things are not me by the very nature of ownership. The self or the person as a whole (this means both the mind and the body) is not literally "owned" in my view, and it very well should not be. "Ownership" does not refer to physiological control (which is what Molyneux is defining "self-ownership" to be), and this is where the confusion really stems from. A slave-master doesn't have direct physiological control over their slave, but the slave is (at least partially) "owned" by them. And when I say that I own my car, for example, presumably I'm not claiming to have the ability to control it telepathically.

Molyneux also tried to point out that I'm too concerned with what other people think - that I may object "but other people my use this term differently" but what other people think doesn't matter. Well, the entire point is that I myself am the "other people" in this discussion - and that Molyneux is not giving me a chance to express what I mean by my terms. I'm expected to accept his definition of "self-ownership" in order for a debate to occur. The entire point is that I don't define "ownership" as physiological or mental control! When I say "I don't own myself", I am not saying that "I don't have mental intentionality and physiological control" - I'm pointing out that this isn't the same thing as "ownership". Molyneux is conflating "ownership" with "direct control" in this way. Once we understand "ownership" to refer to something other than "direct control" in this sense, then my statement that "I don't own myself" simply isn't even subject to the contradiction that Molyneux wants to point out. That was a good 10-15 minutes of him avoiding my point!

Furthermore, precisely what "self" is being referred to ("self" as body? "self" as mind? "self" as both body and mind?) is often interchanged between different senses throughout the course of a discussion on "self-ownership". Which "self" is it then that we are speaking of? Molyneux seemed to vaguely aknowledge the dualism problem without really solving it - the closest he came to solving it was by proclaiming that the mind owns the body, but I don't find this to be sufficient and I think that the term "ownership" can only be used metaphorically here at best. The line between proclaiming that we are "possessed" by a spirit and proclaiming that the mind owns the body seems rather slim to me.

What The Hell Does "Rights" Mean?

Whenever I actually did bring up the question of rights and prescriptive ethics, Molyneux seemed to mostly avoid addressing it. A few times he denied that rights exist, but the sense in which he is making that claim (I.E. that they do not tangibly exist, nor are they in a platonic realm of forms) isn't in dispute and has nothing to do with the question at hand; it's beside the point and begging the question. This is also confusing because Molyneux actually does advocate rights concepts, so upon closer inspection it comes off as if he's just nitpicking. Clearly, he has a certain concept of liberty that is prescriptive, so I don't see the point of going over the fact that it isn't intrinsic. Of course it isn't intrinsic.

And of course a rights claim isn't gauranteed to be respected, but that's entirely beside the point. That rights aren't gauranteed to be respected or recognized is a separate question than the validity of prescriptive rights claims as such - rights concepts are not meant to be a description of properties of objects. Molyneux's claim that he doesn't believe in rights is definitely a sleight of hand (much like his claim that "the government doesn't exist") - just before (and after) he nitpicked about rights in this way he was essentially claiming that someone's denial of property rights affirms property rights.

But if by "self-ownership" and "property rights", Molyneux is claiming not to refer to prescriptive ethics at all but a mere description of traits, then how can he simultaneously be claiming to be proving libertarian ethics? And why would he be a libertarian in the first place if all he cares about is a description of traits? Libertarian anarchism is not merely a description of traits - while it may integrate theories about what is into it, and may be based on one to an extent, it is not defined or understood as a mere description about what is, it is understood to be a prescriptive political philosophy.

Ethics or Science?

What's somewhat perplexing is Molyneux's insistance on regarding UPB as if it is just a descriptive methodology, when the main contention in question is in the realm of prescriptive ethics. Molyneux seems to be putting himself foreward as if he's just engaging in rigorous epistemological methodology. It ends up being confusing because while he tends to defend UPB when it is questioned by acting like it isn't prescriptive, at the same time he wants to claim that by using its methodology one can validate ethical theories. But it seems a little strange to say that a purely deductive and deconstructive methodology can validate ethics. And it's as if Molyneux wants to both affirm and deny that he's doing ethical theory at the same time. If UPB is just the scientic method or a description that has nothing to do with prescriptive ethics, then I fail to see why it shouldn't lead us to moral nihilism - and yet Molyneux is definitely not a moral nihilist.

When he's questioned, it's almost as if he plays the role of moral nihilist, as to deny that he engages in moralizing and to act like UPB is just like rigorous scientific description. So when UPB is critisized, Molyneux falls back on characterizing it as just science - an objective description of properties. Of course, ethics is not science, so how could he claim that UPB has anything to do with ethics at all? If it's just a description of "what is" and nothing more, then it has nothing to do with ethics. If it has something to do with ethics, then it cannot be "just the scientific method". If Molyneux really wants to be dealing just with "the scientific method", then technically he shouldn't be talking about ethics at all! For the scientific method isn't meant for ethical propositions - it has nothing (at least directly) to do with the field of ethics at all. There is no such thing as "preferable behavior" in terms of science.

Binaries and Negativistic Methodology

When I brought up my problem with the idea of using a purely deductive and negativistic approach that just rules things out without providing a comprehensive positive case for anything, Molyneux seemed to miss the substance of the concern and talked in terms of the basic binary between truth and falsehood. But what was in question was not the binary between truth and falsehood, it was in the context of more specific questions in which there are a multitude of possible positions. To give a contextual example, if our concern is with finding an answer in a panacea of property rights theories, the binary of "property rights is valid" vs. "property rights is invalid" isn't really relevant. The question at hand in this case is much more complicated than that.

The standard positions on a particular question may very well all be false, or some may contain elements of both truth and falsehood, or there may even be no true answer to the question. Not every question is strictly binary in the same way as the true/false dichotomy itself is. The fundamental true/false binary is beside the point. For example, if I rule out the statement that "eating an apple is moral", it does not necessarily follow that the statement that "eating an apple is immoral" is validated. In this case, I would claim that eating an apple is neither moral or immoral - my conception of morality doesn't even cover that question. This is an example showing that not all binaries are "true" or "false".

Or we may be presented with a false dilemma. For example, the false dilemma of either "the mind doesn't exist" (eliminative materialism and epiphenominalism) or "the mind manifests the universe" (solipsism and idealism). In this case, I would claim that neither proposition is true. For another example, if we rule out the statement that "I am happy", it wouldn't necessarily follow that "I am sad" is validated. Perhaps I feel neither happy or sad, or I don't think that either of them can be attributed absolutely to me in the scenario. Hence, the binaries that we may be presented with on many questions may not mesh with the more fundamental true/false binary as such. Dare I say that when we venture much beyond the true/false binary, many of the rest of the binaries don't hold as absolutes.

My concern is with a methodology that merely rules out positions and then accepts whatever is left without anything positive to prove it and without investigating further. You might be able to collapse someone else's position as contradictary and proceed to rule it out, but that wouldn't necessarily be a "proof" of your position. Neither would a contradiction between the behavior of someone who makes a proposition and their proposition necessarily disprove their position or prove yours. Molyneux seems to deny that he does this with UPB, but I see some ways in which he may very well be doing it, due to the emphasis on the form of argument and the tendency to consider everything to be binary. I think this avoids the detailed substance of concepts and propositions.

Universality and Consistency

Another issue I briefly touched on in the discussion but didn't get to explain is that consistant application of an ethic, strictly speaking, isn't what proves or disproves it - you could theoretically consistantly apply or universalize any rule you want. The test of internally consistent application tells us nothing about the actual content of a premise. One can consistently apply an incorrect premise - one can have a consistantly authoritarian philosophy and its problem would not be one of internal inconsistency but the problem would be the premise itelf. The standard of consistent application alone cannot validate or invalidate an ethical theory because it has no bearing on the actual content of the ethical theory. This is part of why I find UPB to be incomplete or lacking - all it cares about is consistency in application of propositions, but it can say nothing about the content of propositions as such. That doesn't seem to get us anywhere.

Molyneux wants to claim that propositions such as "theft is moral" are not universalizable. Sure they are - all you have to do is form a philosophy in which the rule is absolute. On could theoretically form a philosophy in which "theft is moral" is a universal absolute. If the people proposing such an ethic end up not liking being stolen from or do not always steal everything, this wouldn't prove that their philosophy is internally inconsistant or that its content is incorrect, it would prove that their behavior isn't consistent with their philosophy. Once again, the "contradictions" that Molyneux often point out are not necessarily internal contradictions in a philosophy or premise but a contradiction between theory and action. And I say: so what? All you have proven, at best, is hypocrisy or dishonesty.

Molyneux seemed to want to distance himself from the idea that a contradiction between philosophy and action proves or disproves a philosophy, yet at the same time he essentially went on to make use of that idea - and almost seems to be trying to derive an ought from an is in the sense of claiming that a performative contradiction made by someone who is denying a certain "ought" is an affirmation of that "ought" (of course, Molyneux will then shrink back into acting as if all he's doing is engaging in the description of properties, not "oughts"). Hence, he used an example of someone saying "property rights are not valid" or "there should not be property rights" and then being confused when the person they made the statement denying or questioning property rights towards ignores them or responds to someone else - implying that the person who made the statement questioning property rights has a sense of "property rights" in terms of being responsible for their own statements (which Molyneux would like to sum up as "self-ownership").

But again, I say: so what? My entire point is that this has no direct bearing on the truth value of their statement! So why bring up such examples other than as a sleight of hand, an analogy to an absurdity that is beside the point? Doesn't Molyneux realize that "property rights" is not the same thing as the fact of control? If someone says "property rights should not be recognized", the fact that they control property is a separate question from "property rights" as such and their statement is not necessarily intended to deny the fact that people have property. "Property rights" refers to an "ought", not the mere fact that someone currently has property as such. It's as if Molyneux is ignoring when terms are used descriptively and prescriptively, and treats prescriptive statements as if they are meant to be descriptive in the attempt to invalidate them. It's as if I said "I shouldn't exist" and you responded with shock asking me "why do you deny your own existance?". Then when I tried to explain to you why I don't think I should continue existing you kept harping on about how ridiculous it is to deny your own existance.

Now that is a valid analogy!

Next Time?

If I have an official video debate with Molyneux, I'm going to have to be sure to bring these points up. It seems like whenever I started to explain my position or make a point, Molyneux would go on to make a tangental point that I don't disagree with in principle (such as pointing out basic performative contradictions in certain ontological claims such as "I don't exist" or screaming "sound doesn't exist" in someone's ear - I fully agree with Molyneux that statements of that sort seem to be self-detonating, but those are not the propositions that I'm talking about and that is irrelevant to the question I'm exploring).

And that avoids addressing what my concern is - it's as if he's trying to lead you into agreement with him on some basic point that isn't directly related to what you are disputing, almost to fool you into agreeing with him on what's in dispute. But I'm not talking about ontological claims and my dispute with UPB is not about ontology - it's about analyzing, justifying and invalidating prescriptive ethics. And that's precisely what Molyneux largely avoided getting into in this discussion, despite the fact that I kept trying to bring it up (he kept shifting the discussion towards ontology and description).

Discussion With Molyneux On Libertarianism and Philosophy

The video debate with Molyneux has been stalled for the future, but I did talk to him on skype for about an hour and half, which is being released as a podcast here.

We mostly just had a discussion about libertarianism and philosophy. For the most part, I didn't a have a chance to get into the nitty gritty of my objections to UPB - and we didn't really get into the question of rights. He claimed he didn't believe in rights a few times, and while I understand the sense in which he's claiming that, he does advocate rights. The official video debate will definitely attempt to get more into the rights question.

Debating With Molyneux

I've essentially been cordially invited to have a discussion and debate via video (probably using the program oovoo, which is has a pretty nice video conferance platform that allows paying users to record video conferances of up to 6 people at once) with Stefan Molyneux, particularly about libertarian ethics and his "universally preferable behavior" approach to libertarianism. All the details of when have not been worked out yet. Knowing Molyneux, he will probably record the discussion and post it as a video on youtube and at his website.

Quite a few months ago, Molyneux already debated one person who technically posts at this very blog (although he hasn't made a post here for a while) - XOmniverse, who I also know from youtube. They debated about a similar topic, and XOmniverse has some problems with "UPB" that are somewhat similar to mine (although he is a former Objectivist and I am not, which probably makes our temperments notably distinct).

The area in the realm of ethics in which both me and XOmniverse both tend to differ with Molyneux is in our general use of consequentialism and egoism, and the tendency to critisize a vague maxim-based or axiomatic approach to libertarianism. Nonetheless, there are also other angles that I am critical of UPB from that may not be completely shared by XOmniverse (for example, my use of the is-ought dichotomy and some of my own objections to Rand's ethics), so this should not necessarily turn out to be a rinse and repeat of the same discussion by any stretch of the imagination.

Molyneux On Corporations

Is it just me or does Stefan Molyneux seem to have a fairly left-libertarian view of corporations, at least in comparison to many in the Mises Institute crowd?

The Meaning and Scope of Non-aggression (First Draft)

I've decided to make a pdf of the first draft of the chapter "The Meaning and Scope of Non-aggression" from "Reconstructing Libertarianism". This first draft is 17 pages, although it will definitely be expanded upon. It may very well eventually be broken up into a number of sections due to the main questions that it explores, and these could be expanded upon as sections of the overall chapter. Some of the issues touched on need more elaboration. This most certainly is not the final version, but I think that it sufficies as an official first draft of the chapter. It's certainly something to work with and extend, and I'm open to suggestions and criticisms.

The main issues touched on and positions expressed in the chapter are the vagueness of a maxim-based conception of the NAP, a critical view of pre-emptive violence, an exposition and criticism of proportionality theories, objections to the formal concept of punishment and objections to arbitrary violence-justifying conceptions of property rights. A number of both classical and contemporary libertarians are referenced both for support and as targets of criticism. This includes Murray Rothbard, Herbert Spencer, Walter Block, Charles Johnson, Leonard Piekoff (yea, not really a libertarian at all, I know - he's a target of criticism), Roy Halliday, Stephan Kinsella and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.

It seems pretty clear to me that I'm going to have to break this up into sections along the lines of a section on defense, a section on pre-emptive aggression, a section on punishment and proportionality and a section on aggression and property. Once it is broken up into such sections, they will definitely need a good deal of elaboration. Hence, the material in this first draft may very well provide the basis for what will become either separate chapters of a section or sections of a long chapter. The issue of punishment and proportionality may very well deserve a chapter or extensive sub-section in its own right. Nonetheless, all the sections should ultimately tie back in to the general theme of the NAP.

A Progress Report

I made a pdf of the 2nd draft of "What Is Libertarianism?", the introduction to "Reconstructing Libertarianism". Ironically, the introduction is the part that I've worked on the least and is considerably shorter than the first drafts I have of the following chapters. It definitely could be more expansive and played with a bit. It is only 6 pages currently. There is not much of a difference between the 2nd draft and the 1st draft other than the addition of several footnotes and referances. I still intend to take some of Danny Shahar's commentary into consideration, so this is definitely not the final version of the introduction. However, with the footnotes added and with it converted into a pdf, I think it suffices as an "official first draft" for the introduction (even though there are a few spots in which I noticed that I left out a word).

As for the rest of the book, I have a completed first draft of what is intended to be the first chapter, "The Meaning and Scope of Non-aggression", which analyzes the varying interpretations of the non-aggression principle and tries to establish a coherant understanding of it. I have also completed a first draft of a chapter titled "Liberty or Equality?", which explores the relationship between liberty and equality in both complimentary and dichotomous terms, although ultimately pushing for a view in which they are compatible. I've also been working on a chapter titled "The Property Question", which attempts to dig deeply into the issue of property rights. Since this is such a heated and complicated subject, this chapter, while uncompleted as a first draft, has ended up being the longest one so far. I've left it alone recently and started working on another chapter titled "Self-ownership as Metaphor and Dualism".

In total, I have approximately 70-80 pages of material written so far. Since there is quite a bit more ground that I intend to cover, the book will definitely end up being at least 200 pages (and I intend for it be 6" by 9" in size in terms of its physical copy) and it will probably be well over that mark by the time it is officially finished. But up until that point, it is still a work very slowly in progress and these chapters are not necessarily in their final form. All in all, I still have a lot of work cut out for me. A few subsequent pdf versions of the introduction may appear in the near future, and eventually an official final version. I'm not sure yet if I intend to release the other chapters as pdf files. The final product will probably be available both for free in pdf and in the form of a purchasable copy.

The Absurdity of Ignoring Consequences and Circumstances

Devotion to a principle regardless of consequences and circumstances does not seem particularly sensible, for consequences and circumstances may disprove a principle or render it useless in a given context. Sometimes it may very well be explicitly against your interest to follow a particular principle, even to the point at which following the principle requires extreme misery or even your death. Sometimes the consequences of a particular principle being implemented as a norm may have generally destructive results and ultimately not par with the intentions of the wielder of the principle or the prescription of the principle itself.

The idea that consequences don't matter at all, that one should stick to a principle without any concern for what the outcome of it really is, can be quite dangerous. If it ends up being the case that one's principle causes mass-misery and death, why should one stick to it? It seems like some sort of dynamism has to be aknowledged, which is to say that principles must be revalueated over time, and hence it may be counterproductive and nonsensical to value a principle for its own sake for one's entire life. Sticking to an abstract principle even if it means the total annialation of the human race as such is a recipe for madness.

The idea that circumstances don't matter at all can also be rather dangerous. Sometimes one may find themself in a situation in which their principles do them no good at all or are even explicitly opposed to their well-being or their very life. The most obvious example of this is probably absolutist pacifism, since the pacifist must abstain from defending their lives when it comes under the explicit threat of violence - if they are going to absolutely stick to their principle, that is. Hence, it may make sense for certain principles to have qualifiers relating to situations or circumstances. This doesn't necessarily mean that the principle is not consistently applied, but that the scope of its application is built into it. For example, presumably people do not wish to apply the concept of "rights" to inanimate objects.

Consequences and circumstances are precisely what can give principles a context and establish a way in which they can become meaningfully instrumental. No principle, strictly speaking, can sensibly be treated as nothing more than an end in and of itself. It may relate to other principles and it may be relational to certain consequences and circumstances. In terms of "usability", some principles could be concieved of as instrumental means towards other principles, the attainment of which are constituted by consequences. A principle may not absolutely be a goal in and of itself, but an instrumental part of obtaining certain goals. The attainment of a goal is in some sense a consequence (and a principle itself) and certain principles may function as guidelines with respect to the means to the attainment of such consequences. But the more basic point is that principles and goals are relational to eachother and that principles do not exist in a vacuum.

Questioning Deonotological Libertarianism

[Note: Just because I question deontology does not necessarily mean that I support utilitarianism. I do not support utilitarianism, and I find Frederich Neitzsche's criticisms of the pleasure/pain principle to be fairly informative. Futhermore, deontology vs. utilitarianism could be viewed as a bit of a false dichotomy. However, this does not mean that I'm a Randian either. I actually find Rand's notion of "man qua man" to be laughable.]

It seems to be the case that all of the attempts to axiomatically prove libertarianism are deontological in nature. This is most obvious in the case of Hans Hoppe's "argumentation ethics", since Hoppe is openly a Kantian, and Kant is the father of modern deontology. And Stefan Molyneux's "universally preferable behavior" is also distinctly Kantian, despite the fact that Molyneux is a post-objectivist (which is a term that is usually meant to refer either to someone who used to be an Objectivist and has moved on or someone who is heavily influenced by Objectivism without officially being an Objectivist). It may sound rather harsh, but "universally preferable behavior" is essentially Kantian ethics rehashed.

The deontological nature of "universally preferable behavior" can most easily be seen in the fact that Molyneux essentially ignores what he calls "the argument from effect", which is to say the consideration of consequences. Apparently consequences and circumstances don't really matter - principles are thought of as being self-evident and absolute without regard for consequences and circumstances. Bringing consequences and circumstances into the question is apparently supposed to be invalidated on the grounds that it flies in the face of universality. Yet principles that are held without regard for any context would seem to be what Rand liked to call "floating abstractions" - they are not grounded in anything.

As soon as we do try to ground principles in something, deontology implodes, for the principles are no longer valuable "in themselves" so much as valuable relative to other principles and other things. The principles, strictly speaking, are no longer treated as being "self-evident", for one has to provide an actual reason for them. But a strict deontology will have none of this - the principles must be valuable "in themselves" irrespective of context. Hence, viewed deontologically, the principles are divorced from self-interest. They are supposed to be valid without regard for relationality and usage. They are supposed to have the character of the eternal, the unchanging, the transcendant, the unhuman.

Even in secular deontology, the essence of the divine command theory does not seem to be overcome. Instead of "god", "nature" is supposed to do the commanding. In place of "god's law" we put "nature's law". While the notion of "natural law" has certainly come a long way since its more religious beginnings, the reliance on the concept of "man's nature" may still be questionable. A deontological "natural law" theory would seem to propose that we have a "duty to nature" or a "duty to man's nature". Whether the emphasis is placed on "god" or "man", we are still told that we have an intrinsic duty. Such a duty apparently does not need justification, since it is concieved of as being intrinsic. Such a duty, strictly speaking, is not towards a thing but to the principle itself, to the concept. We must live for the sake of the concept, while the concept needs no justification - for it is treated as a given.

But what is such "intrinsic duty" but a spectre? Perhaps I may very well except a duty - but it must be explained to me precisely why I should have such a duty. Concepts do not have value to me intrisically, "in themselves", but in their relation to other concepts and to things that I can grasp - and, at base, to my self-interest. If you cannot explain to me precisely why I should favor your principle and insist that I must accept it "in itself", if you cannot explain what relevance it has to me (even indirectly), then I will probably dismiss it - and for good reason. For the deontologist has no positive case for their principles, since their principles are treated as a self-evident starting point. Yet even the deontologist has motivations and reasons, despite the fact that their philosophical methodology ignores them.

One of the major problems with deontology is its inability to connect morality to self-interest. The individual is expected to become an automaton that serves principles in a purely disinterested way - as if it were possible to be so disinterested or indifferent. And while the utilitarians, in their own way, do seem to connect morality to self-interest, they have such a superficial and simplified conception of self-interest as to make a self-aware egoist laugh. "The greatest good for the greatest number" - that is the utilitarian's deontology, their contextless and unsubstantiated principle that floats in the sky. Our utilitarian friends aren't much better than the deontologists, and in some cases they may very well be worse.

If in discussion and debate someone claims that their principles are self-evident and absolute truths that cannot be denied without being affirmed, without putting foreward any reason for why such principles are true and why they should be favored, then people probably aren't very likely to accept such principles, and the deontologist in the scenario will probably be thought of as an asshole. The communist says, "private property is invalid!", and our deontological libertarian friend need not actually disprove them, they can merely proclaim "you have just proved the validity of private property by argueing with me" or "private property is valid because it must be presupposed in order for us to debate", and any substantive debate on the question henceforth becomes nullified.

Perhaps some people might be seduced by such arbitrary proclaimations, but most people will continue believing what they believe anyways, and the rest of us will view it as rhetorical trickery. More self-concious and intellectually subtle libertarians will see the problem with this approach, for it effectively reduces to the notion that "libertarianism is valid because libertarianism is valid", "because because" or "because I said so". What circular and question-begging nonsense this is. It's enough to cause one to bang one's head against the wall, or by the very least, it could lead to epic facepalming. But take your palms off of your faces, you self-concious libertarians, and use them (or your fingers, that is) to write for the purpose of clearing such confusion up. It is one thing for libertarianism to not be the norm - it's another thing for libertarians to undermine libertarianism.

On Contradictions Between Philosophy and Action

Another problem that I see with the attempt to prove "self-ownership" and "property rights" as an a priori axoim that is inherently established by the act of argumentation (as Hans Hoppe's argumentation ethics seems to essentially be) is that a contradiction between one's philosophy and one's actions does not constitute a "proof" or "disproof" of a given philosophy in and of itself. It may be proof that the person in question is being hypocritical, but that doesn't necessarily disprove what they are argueing. This is also a problem with Stefan Molyneux's "UPB".

Someone could concievably argue in favor of liberty while violating the liberty of others in their lives or argue in favor of tyranny while mostly being benign towards others on a personal level. But consistency between one's philosophy and one's actions is not a proper measure of "truth", it is the measure of hypocrisy and dishonesty. A hypocrit could theoretically have valid arguments, while an honest person could theoretically have invalid arguments. A man's honesty and integrity, strictly speaking, is not the measure of the "truth" of his statements, it is question of the character and style of a person. There is no absolute correlation between the truth value of a proposition and the character of the person who makes the proposition.

It also doesn't seem to make much sense to posit that what you believe is inherently presupposed by everyone else. Someone could concievably sincerely believe that "slavery is moral" or "morality doesn't matter" and they could concieavly argue those premises without necessarily contradicting themselves. People do not necessarily presuppose your premises by argueing. And even if the behavior of argueing in some sense contradicts what they are argueing, that is does not inherently nullify their argument. One has to explain why their argument is false, and the fact that someone's behavior is hypocritical does not constitute an explaination, it only begs the question and is not directly relevant to the person's argument as such.

What a curiosity: the presupposition that your presuppositions are presupposed by everyone else! What circular logic such an a priori intrinsicism ends up being. By argueing with you, I implicitly prove you correct? Do people not realize how abusable such a method is? One could theoretically use it to justify just about anything, since it essentially means that one's premises are simply assumed to be absolute and universal truths without actually having to explain why. Hence, one can avoid questions and criticisms of one's premises by simply brushing them off as inherently being disproven upon utterance, while you yourself have not argumentatively demonstrated the case for your premises. Noone should take that seriously.

Do slaves have "self-ownership"?

I'd like to extend on my criticism of Hoppe's argumentation ethics by elaborating on the point about the difference between "self-ownership" as it is used ontologically and "self-ownership" as it is used ethically. I realize that this point has been made in one way or another by others before me, but I am putting it in my own words and using my own conceptual framework to express it.

If all one really means by "self-ownership" is the capacity to purposefully act (and this capacity, at best, is all that "argumentation ethics" proves), then slaves must be said to have "self-ownership", since even though they are slaves their basic nature as human beings has not changed and therefore they retain the capacity to purposefully act despite being a slave. Liberty does not merely mean that someone has the capacity to purposefully act, it more specifically entails that their sphere of action is not infringed upon. A slave has the capacity to purposefully act, but their sphere of action is significantly limited by their master.

This is the problem with trying to prove "self-ownership" by treating it as an ontological given upon the act of argumentation. A slave completely retains the basic capacity to argue and act in general. Presumably, their state of slavery does not eliminate their will. And yet it would be absurd to proclaim that a slave proves that they have rights by engaging in argumentation. They could argue until they are blue in the face, but their rights would still be restricted by their master. In this sense, people are not "inherently free", otherwise there would be absolutely no point in proclaiming that people should be free in the first place.

The slave argues not because they have rights (and by "have rights" I mean their actualization, not "having rights" in the more basic sense of an ought), but because either their master gives them the permission to argue or they manage to argue in spite of their master's control. In terms of the actualization of rights, the slave does not have rights, or at least not completely. And in terms of rights purely as a prescription, the fact that the slave argues by itself does not does not "prove" the validity of rights as a prescription. But if argumentation ethics is to be taken seriously and applied consistent, we would have to say that the slave is "free" and implicitly proves that they have rights by arguing. Surely this is nonsensical if not outrageous.

Clearly, the fact that people engage in argumentation is not sufficient in and of itself to prove that people have rights. For in all times and all places, people who do not completely have rights have engaged in argumentation! Upon them engaging in argumentation, it is not implicitly proven that they have a certain set of rights that is consistent with a specifically libertarian social theory. To treat rights as some sort of inherent ontological fact in this way is to confuse what the meaning and purpose of rights is to begin with. The purpose of a theory of rights is not to prove some sort of ontological characteristic that people inherently have, for rights are ethical norms and not merely descriptive traits. At best, they can only sensibly be treated descriptively upon their realization as ethical norms or as a description of such ethical norms as such.

What's strange about Hoppe's argumentation ethics is that it appears to be attempting to make an "ontological proof" of libertarianism. Unfortunately, there is no such ontological proof, because libertarianism is not an ontological fact. "Liberty", strictly speaking, is not some sort of "natural state" that we cannot possibly escape any more than "tyranny" is such a "natural state". Argumentation ethics seems like a naturalistic fallacy because it treats liberty as if it an intrinsic quality of all humans. Perhaps all people have the capacity for liberty, but the realization of liberty as such is not intrinsic.

Furthermore, the attempt to derive a specific notion of rights and the general premise that people should have liberty from such an assumption of intrinsic ontology inherently is fallacious and bumps into the most obvious sense of the is-ought dichotomy. If liberty is some sort of intrinsic quality in this way, then there is no rational reason to argue that we should have liberty. An "ethics of liberty" would henceforth be completely pointless. On the other hand, if liberty is some sort of capacity that has not yet been fully realized, if liberty is prescriptive in nature and hence constitutes an ethical norm, then it makes no sense whatsoever to appeal to liberty as an intrinsic ontological fact, for in this context it is a goal that has not yet been realized (and hence in this sense it simply is not a "fact").

In related news: Dmitri Chernikov has written his own blogpost today expressing why he has problems with Hoppe's argumentation ethics.