I've already written and made numerous videos on this, but I don't think I've put all of the objections together in one place. There are three major reasons that have lead me to reject the concept of "self-ownership", or at least it has lead me to reject the way that it is often used in libertarian discourse. So I'd like to summarize what the three main concerns are. However, I'd like to clarify at the get-go that I do not reject the premise or right's claim that one's person should not be infringed upon, I just no longer rely on "self-ownership" to argue for it. So my rejection of "self-ownership" should not be misconstrued as a rejection of personal sovereignty. In fact, my view is that the language of self-ownership sometimes undermines the argument for personal sovereignty.
The Dualism and Internality vs. Externality Problem
Self-ownership seems to imply an unsolvable dualism between yourself and yourself; I.E. if you are the owner, then you aren’t it and if you are owned, then you aren’t the owner. If you’re owned by others, then you’re a slave. If you’re not owned by others, it doesn’t necessarily follow that "you own yourself". You can’t be both the owned and the owner at once, and consequentially "self-ownership" must warp the definition of ownership (which normally implies a relation between subject and object, not an internal relation within a subject) in order to even remotely make sense. The way that I define and understand the concept of "ownership" in general, you can only own things that are external to you; that is, as an "owner" you are categorically distinguished from "the owned".
A special note: it turns out that Francious Tremblay independantly came to a similar conclusion while thinking along similar lines as me here a few years ago, and he did it prior to me taking this stance. So I feel that I should credit Tremblay for moving in this direction before me, even though I did not come to this conclusion by his direct influence and the way that we approach the question is not absolutely identical. I came to this conclusion more as a consequence of my own little thoughts and tinkerings about philosophy of mind (particularly the classic "mind/body problem"), which resulted in a rejection of dualism (although I also reject some of the more absurd forms of monism). Nonetheless, Tremblay deserves credit for rejecting self-ownership on similar grounds before me.
The Chicken/Egg Issue
Self-ownership tends to be a manifestation of a theory that places property rights first and then defines self-ownership on the basis of a property rights concept. This leads to a problem of circularity in which one has to presuppose a theory of property rights in "self-ownership" while simultaneously argueing as if "self-ownership" is the foundation. If property truly is the first principle, then "self-ownership" is sort of reduced to a mere entailment of property theory, and people are regarded as property (leading to obvious slavery concerns). On the other hand, if "self-ownership" truly is the first principle, it collapses as soon as you try to justify it via appeal to a property rights concept that presumably comes after it. This is a serious logical problem.
It is also important to stress a related problem that tends to arise as a consequence of this one, which is that some libertarians essentially use "self-ownership" as a basis to justify notions of "voluntary slavery" that rub up against inalienable conceptions of rights. There is a tendency to treat "the self" as if it is just like any piece of property, I.E. as something to be bought and sold. I think that this is a negative consequence of treating property as an ungrounded first principle or axoim, which potentially leads to very serious slavery concerns precisely because one has not categorically distinguished people from property in an ethical sense.
Self-ownership as a Fact vs. Self-ownership as a Right
Self-ownership tends to be used in blatant contradiction to the most obvious sense of the is/ought dichotomy. That is, some libertarians tend to switch back and forth between defining "self-ownership" as a physiological fact that you control your body and a rights claim to not have one’s person infringed upon. The latter cannot directly be derived from the former and they cannot reasonably be categorically conflated. Self-ownership arguments sometimes devolve into absurdity when the proponent is argueing for self-ownership as if it is a simple inherent and unavoidable fact of human existance. If that’s the case, then it makes no sense as an imperative or rights claim, since it simply is what it is. This was what came up in my debate with Stefan Molyneux, since he apparently insists on using a purely physiological definition of "self-ownership".
This use of "self-ownership" can potentially be open to a lot of abuse in discourse. For the most explicit example that I have experienced and witnessed, Stefan Molyneux tends to act as if people are argueing against the fact that they have physiological autonomy when they argue against self-ownership, and based on this assumption he makes the misleading argument that anyone who argues against "self-ownership" is implicitly proving it by the act of argumentation itself and therefore their argument self-detonates; his entire "UPB" is based on this form. Hans Hoppe also makes a similar misleading argument with his "argumentation ethics", and Stephan Kinsella's "estoppel argument" takes a similar form in the context of the issue of punishment. All of these arguments and theories fail to justify libertarian ethics for the same basic reasons.
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Letter #16 from Kurt in Jail
2 hours ago
12 comments:
For what it's worth, you may find the discussion of the distinction between "self-ownership" and "property in the person" in this article informative as you keep thinking through this important issue:
Carole Pateman, "Self-Ownership and Property in the Person: Democratization and a Tale of Two Concepts," Journal of Political Philosophy 10.1 (2002): 20-53.
Thanks for the suggestion, I'll be sure to give it a look.
Definitely agreed on the circularity of self-ownership as justification for property. As for philosophy of mind, I'm a functionalist, so it's no problem for me to regard the self as an abstract, essentially mental and informational entity or process which supervenes on a particular material implementation. It can't exist without the physical implementation, but it might be realized in multiple different possible physical systems. For example, if I move a few molecules in your brain around at random, or just wait for thermodynamics to do the same, it doesn't change your mental state at all as long as the perturbations are small enough. Far more speculatively, we might consider scenarios like uploading, where the same mind could be realized in a radically different substrate which produces the same higher-level dynamics.
Anyway, from that perspective, self-ownership doesn't make sense because the self isn't the kind of entity that can be owned. It's an abstract informational structure, partaking more of the nature of software than of meat. It will do as it will, as determined by its present state and its current inputs, and the idea of being in possession of it has little clear meaning. I am, of course, not a believer in intellectual property either.
On the other hand, we can see the self as a distinct entity from the brain or body, although it can't exist independently from those. Well, at least not with present technology, although I suppose in the general case we should say that it cannot exist independently from *some* material substrate. Therefore, given this view of the relation of the self to the body and the idea of property (which, like all ethical ideas, will require some independent axiom) it does seem reasonable to talk about the self owning its body. This seems to provide the unification and theoretical parsimony that make the self-ownership theory attractive, where we can understand personal rights, liberty of movement, morphological freedom, bodily integrity and so on as logical consequences of the property right to one's own body.
On closer examination, though, it's a rather peculiar sort of property right, in that, at least so far as the limitation of the self being unalterably tied to a particular material substrate holds, possession cannot be tranferred. Whether or not we regard the ownership of the body as inalienable or not, possession of the body clearly is. Thus, the voluntary slavery problem becomes isomorphic to the distinction between usufruct and legal title. Perhaps we may resolve it by simply saying it seems absurd to speak of transferring title to property which it is not physically possible to transfer possession of, given an understanding that title as a right to possess.
"Self-ownership tends to be used in blatant contradiction to the most obvious sense of the is/ought dichotomy. That is, some libertarians tend to switch back and forth between defining "self-ownership" as a physiological fact that you control your body and a rights claim to not have one’s person infringed upon."
This is really annoying, the worst part is that they don't seem to REALISE they're doing it! "You control yourself (physically) therefor you ought to own yourself" isn't even going to accomplish what libertarians want, since you in fact don't control most of your body.
he makes the misleading argument that anyone who argues against "self-ownership" is implicitly proving it by the act of argumentation itself and therefore their argument self-detonates;That man has read way too much Ayn Rand
That was very well written, and it gives me something to think about. But there is a bit of a problem, I'm still a duelist.
I, am not really my body, but it is a type of language that when someone strikes my body, we are in the habit of saying "he hit me" instead of he hit my body.
This idea of duelism is pretty easily defended, As it is written often enough that we leave our bodies when we die.
but even still, for "us" for "me" and not my body, you are absolutely correct there is no self ownership in that aspect, there is only self.
And remember, just because you run into a chicken and the egg dilemma, that doesn't mean that chickens and eggs don't exist. It only means that we have reached the frontiers of understanding.
I've been uncomfortable with the concept of "self-ownership" for a while too because it seems to imply mind/body dualism which I reject. If I remember correctly, I also thought of this problem independently of Tremblay, although I do read his blog and remember his post about it, so I could've gotten it from him.
I only started reading your blog recently, so I'm wondering what your alternative basis for ethics is. What are your most important entries on the subject?
Yea, I did find that out, but you formulated it better than me. ;)
Self-ownership is not incoherent, and indeed is crucial to libertarian theory, if it's understood properly--if it's understood simply to mean the idea that each person, as opposed to others, has the right to control his own body. (See my How We Come To Own Ourselves, A Theory of Contracts: Binding Promises, Title Transfer, and Inalienability and Defending Argumentation Ethics, for more detail). As for the disparaging remarks about Hoppe's theory above, I am reminded of Rothbard's great Hoppephobia, where he wrote:
"The Lomasky review is an interesting example of what is getting to be a fairly common phenomenon: Hoppephobia. Although he is an amiable man personally, Hoppe’s written work seems to have the remarkable capacity to send some readers up the wall, blood pressure soaring, muttering and chewing the carpet. It is not impolite attacks on critics that does it. Perhaps the answer is Hoppe’s logical and deductive mode of thought and writing, demonstrating the truth of his propositions and showing that those who differ are often trapped in self-contradiction and self-refutation."
Kinsella, you're plunging into incoherence now. "the right to control your own body"? That assumes that other people can control "your body." But that's biologically impossible.
"Tremblay," yeah, it's small comfort to a slave, drug prisoner, rape victim, or concentration camp inmate that it's impossible for someone else to use, possess, control their body. Whatever.
Once again an absolutely useless comment from the right-wing drunkard.
If you're a "slave, drug prisoner, rape victim, or concentration camp inmate," then *you're already in deep shit.* *Anything* would be "small comfort."
If you're a right-wing drunkard apologetic for capitalism, then being told that you're not also physically crippled would be "small comfort."
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